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Abstract
This article uses Arend Lijphart’s notion of ‘power-sharing consocia-
tionalism’ to understand the mutually reinforcing conf lict system and the 
barriers to resolving such conf licts in South Sudan. ‘Consociationalism’ 
has been affirmed as an ideal approach for resolving conf licts in ethnically 
divided societies, but in South Sudan, the formal institutions of power 
sharing have not delivered sustainable peace. Analysis in this article reveals 
that the implementation of the various ‘peace agreements’ and ‘deals’ 
deviated from classical ‘consociationalism’. Consequently limited attention 
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was paid to inter-ethnic tensions and too much emphasis was placed on the 
mechanics of power sharing among the executive and military institutions, 
leading to the proliferation of ‘organised political movements’. Rather than 
focusing on the mechanics of power sharing, a viable consociational model 
for South Sudan should concentrate on how such multifaceted layers of 
issues can be accommodated within a single settlement. Therefore, the 
South Sudan conf lict system requires a stronger reconceptualisation of 
issues. Hence we have coined the term ‘tragedy of ethnic diversity’, not 
as a replacement of the well-known concept of ‘resource curse’, but as 
new thinking that might shape future research and scholarship in the 
increasingly complex South Sudan conf lict system. 
Keywords: Consociationalism, power sharing, conf lict resolution, 
ethnicity, tragedy of ethnic diversity, South Sudan
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1. Introduction: The conflict in South Sudan 
The disquieting relationship between President Salva Kiir and his former 
Vice-President, Dr Riek Machar, defines the conf lict situation in the 
Republic of South Sudan. It is this unclear relationship that has framed the 
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intra-South Sudan conf lict as ‘ethnocentric’. The country has experienced 
intractable conf licts, but also limited intermittent peace spells. Yet, the 
historical ‘power struggle’ within the military, political, territorial and 
economic structures continues to entangle the country in more humanitarian 
and development crises (Madut and Hutchinson 1999:126; Kuol 2016:6). 
Although some scholars such as Clemence Pinaud (2014:193) have argued 
that the problem of South Sudan cannot be juxtaposed with ‘ethnicity’, 
it is equally important to attest that within this ‘system of ethnic-based 
class domination’, tensions tend to emerge along the deeply entrenched 
fault lines: 1) ethnic affiliation; 2) socio-economic differentiation; and 
3) loyalty buttressed up by the ‘big man’ syndrome. In contrast to this 
argument, Jurg Steiner (1981:1245) observes that instead of focusing only 
on ethnic divisions of a society, ‘levels of cultural segmentation’ should 
also be studied within the realm of consociationalism (Mehler 2009b:455).
Attempts by scholars such as Francis Deng (1997) to conceptualise 
consociationalism through the lens of ethnicity link this model of conf lict 
resolution to value systems, institutions and patterns of behaviour that 
define a society. However, Johan Galtung (1958:28), considered as one of 
the pioneers of Peace and Conf lict Studies, is sceptical and reckons that 
‘value’-based conf licts are the most difficult to erase from the human 
race. Yet while this model of conf lict resolution based on ‘shared values’ as 
opposed to ‘absolute ethnicity’ has worked in resolving European conflicts 
such as the case of Switzerland (Mueller 2014:90), the patronages and 
politics of ‘who knows whom’ in sub-Saharan Africa complicate the quest 
for sustainable peace in South Sudan.  
Considering these conceptual incongruences and contextual convolutions, 
this article argues that the current ethno-political uncertainty and 
turbulence in South Sudan may not be resolved merely through formal 
governance institutions. Furthermore, this conceptual indistinctness has 
made it harder for scholars to explore other models of conf lict resolution, 
because much attention has been put to the forked Anglo-Egyptian 
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Condominium Policy1 of administration (Collins 1983:470). As a point 
of departure from this historical scholarship, we begin our analysis from 
the understanding that South Sudan suffers from forces of kleptocracy 
characterised by political insolvency and economic stagnation, often 
reinforcing each other at the expense of peace and stability. This ethno-
political manipulation has led to a constellation of ethnic powers (Oxford 
2003:149; United States Central Intelligence Agency [US CIA] 2011; Kalyvas 
2006). The ethnocentric form of governance has dramatically deepened, 
eroding gains made after the formation of the Agreement on the Resolution 
of the Conf lict in South Sudan (ARCSS) mechanism in 2013. The country 
has simply plunged into what Thandika Mkandawire (2015:570) refers to 
as ‘neopatrimonialism’. As such, opportunities can only be accessed by an 
affiliation to a tribal homeland (Zambakari 2013:10). 
In efforts to resolve these layers of conf licts, individuals and some 
stakeholders have undertaken various forms of conf lict resolution, such 
as dialogue, mediation, negotiation and agreements that are sometimes 
clandestine in nature.
Seeking a deeper insight into these conf lict resolution issues and 
mechanisms in South Sudan, this article contributes by addressing a 
lacuna in the theoretical study of Peace and Conf lict, and in particular, 
‘power-sharing consociationalism’. Consociationalism has been a central 
part of South Sudan’s conf lict resolution efforts, where the ideological 
differences between President Salva Kiir and Dr Riek Machar led to 
clandestine political governance on the one hand, and resistance to 
such arrangement by the opposition on the other. This pseudo-political 
architecture apparently allowed President Salva Kiir’s faction to dominate 
the cabinet in the 2015/2016 power-sharing deal. However, Machar on the 
other hand, had not only the majority of the opposition members in the 
cabinet, but also the majority in the opposition membership in the national 
parliament. Although this deal seemed to have accommodated the diversity 
of the country, the July 2016 break up and fierce fighting thereafter, may 
1 This was a British system of governance applied in most British colonies between1899 and 1956.
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have just confirmed the fears that this arrangement was merely a socio-
political reengineering of institutions as opposed to forming a sustainable 
political architecture. On a similar note, President Salva Kiir, pronounced 
his discontent2 with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD)-led Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 17 August 2015: 
It must be stated clearly that the reality of political differences within the 
SPLM [Sudan People’s Liberation Movement] which has been cemented 
in the Peace Agreement, and accepted cheerfully by our colleagues in 
the opposition; requires us all to reorganize ourselves on a new basis. 
This simply means, the SPLM will never be one again as long as we follow 
the implementation (The East African 2016). 
Indeed, the issues raised by President Kiir about the 2015 Peace Agreement 
are not different from his complaints over the April 2016 political 
arrangement. After all, conf lict resolution scholars have observed that 
such an arrangement can only perpetuate covert power sharing among 
the elites at the expense of the society (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015:41–42). 
In such an environment dominated by power-sharing tricks, the prospect 
for attaining durable peace and sustainable political architecture is close 
to an impossibility. This power-sharing consociational mechanism was 
further complicated by the fact that Dr Riek Machar, who is in exile for fear 
of assassination, has renewed ties with Khartoum after being rescued from 
the thick Garamba forest near Dungu by Khartoum organised aircraft 
and f lown first to Kinshasha, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
and later to Khartoum. This followed his escape after the fierce fight 
that broke out between his troops and President Salva Kiir’s in July 2016. 
This period of political entropy is a manifestation of miscalculations by 
both the government and the SPLM-IO (in Opposition) resulting in a 
2 One of the reservations raised by President Salva Kiir was that the IGAD mediators with 
full consent of the former detainees (FDs), managed to keep the SPLM-FDs a distinctive 
group despite the Arusha SPLM-FDs reunification agreement. That brought the FDs back 
to Juba and reinstated Pagan Amum as the Secretary-General of the Party. His colleagues 
were also readmitted into the SPLM political bureau. For more information, see The East 
African 2016.
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convoluted environment in which crafting an effective response on the 
basis of consociational power-sharing results in zero-sum game-bolstering 
apathy among the would-be peace brokers.
Although power-sharing ‘consociationalism’ has been hailed as an ideal 
model for resolving conf licts in ethnically plural societies (Butenschon 
1985:90), there are concerns that in South Sudan, even with an internal 
state-centric approach favoured by ‘consociational’ peace deals, there has 
been an overly narrow focus on the mechanics of ‘power sharing’ – the 
design of the deal, especially with regard to who takes what within the 
internal circles of political and military elites. Despite concerted efforts by 
IGAD-Plus (a group of IGAD Member states and the Troika of the United 
Kingdom, United States and Norway) and the African Union Ad-hoc 
Committee on South Sudan to structure the peace process within the 
framework of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC) 
to foresee the ARCSS, sustainable peace remains elusive. The question 
remains: Why have the formal institutions (political, economic, military 
and territorial) of consociational power sharing not delivered sustainable 
peace in South Sudan?
In order to address this fundamental question, this article is divided into five 
sections. The introduction is followed by section 2 on contextual setting and 
crucial issues. Section 3 is on theoretical perspectives of consociationalism 
and associated principles, section 4 examines the complexity of the conf lict 
and limitations of the power sharing consociationalism in South Sudan 
while section 5 concludes by examining what does and what does not work 
with consociationalism. Finally, conceptual and policy recommendations 
are drawn on how consociationalism needs to be reconfigured in 
fragile societies.  
2. Contextual setting and issues
The discussion of power-sharing consociationalism in South Sudan must 
be understood within the history of several ‘peace agreements’ designed, 
negotiated, implemented or terminated during the period between 
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2005 and 2017. These include the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD)-led Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the 
ARCSS, the IGAD-led High Level Revitalization Peace Forum (HLRF)and 
the most recent ‘clandestine (dis)agreement’ between President Salva Kiir 
and ‘himself ’.
The CPA, which was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 9 January 2005, brought 
an end to the intractable civil war and conf lict (1955–1972; 1983–2005) 
(Rolandsen 2011:217; US Department of State 2011). The Agreement was 
the culmination of the intense negotiations between the National Congress 
Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 
(US CIA 2011). It ushered in a new political dispensation and provided 
for a referendum on self-determination which was conducted in January 
2011 with 98.83 percent of South Sudanese effectively voting to secede from 
the larger Sudan (Shaka 2011:1–4). The General Assembly of the United 
Nations admitted the country into the community of nations as the 193rd 
member of the UN on 14 July 2011 (UN News 2011).
One of the strategic pillars in the CPA was the programme on Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (Munive 2014:340). As part of 
the DDR implementation plan, parties to the CPA established the National 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (NDDC) 
(African Development Bank 2016), which meant that it had been mandated 
to make policy decisions on who should be targeted and how to conduct 
the delicate process of disarmament without creating animosity among 
communities (Lamb et al. 2012:5; Haile and Bara 2013:33; Omeje and 
Minde 2014:27). The DDR process, however, did not happen as planned for 
fear of skewed disarmament. 
The second important aspect of the CPA was a referendum for political 
independence. The referendum (9–15 January 2011), shed bright new light 
not only on the future of the country’s political independence, but also 
on a path-way for peacebuilding activities – cohesion, integration as well 
as post-conf lict reconstruction and development. More than half a decade 
after this question was posed, the challenge of developing an inclusive 
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and democratic governance structure and of upholding the rule of law 
remains a puzzle to this 54th member of the African Union. Indeed, despite 
independence, South Sudan is still linked to the north (Zambakari 2012: 
520), albeit with enmity and cynicism. The difficulty of resolving the 
Abyei border disputes (the Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) attests 
to the intractable tensions between the two countries. The referendum on 
self-determination seems to have been ‘merely a ray of passing sunshine’. 
In any case, the referendum never resolved the hostile relationships forged 
historically over years (Johnson 2014:306; Zambakari 2012:510).
Several attempts have been made to resolve these internal and border 
disputes, but such efforts have failed due to unaddressed local grievances 
that have fed militias and insurgencies countrywide. This has led to what 
researchers have termed a proliferation of ‘organized political movements’, 
and to dysfunctional decentralisation and exclusionary politics (Roque 
and Miamingi 2017:1–5). The August 2015 peace deal seems to have 
been destined for failure. The power-sharing deal brokered by IGAD 
calibrated the distribution of national resources as follows: Government 
of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) (53%); the South Sudan Armed 
Opposition (33%); Former Detainees (7%) and other political parties (7%) 
(IGAD 2015).
The ARCSS was the main mechanism for delivering and monitoring the 
power-sharing deal. The rival parties3 agreed to form a unity government 
and implement reforms in the country. Each faction nominated officials 
who were then appointed to the ministerial positions based on the number 
of ministerial portfolios allocated in the power-sharing deal in the new 
30-member cabinet – where the government or SPLM-IG (in Government) 
had 16 national ministers, SPLM-IO (in Opposition) 10 national ministers, 
3 The rival parties include the government led by President Salva Kiir, the armed opposition 
faction of the SPLM-IO led by First Vice-President, Riek Machar, the Former Detainees 
(FDs) led by the now appointed Foreign Minister, Deng Alor Kuol, acting chairperson 
on behalf of Pagan Amum, former SPLM Secretary-General, and Other Political Parties 
(OPPs) led by Lam Akol, Chairman of the Democratic Change (DC) party, who also chairs 
the alliance of opposition political parties in South Sudan.
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FDs (Former Detainees) two, and OPPs (Other Political Parties) also two. 
This was in addition to a number of deputy ministers (Sudan Tribune 2016). 
In view of the foregoing discussion on ethno-political realignment, it 
would only be fair to frame the question in this article within the realm of 
‘power-sharing consociationalism’. 
3. Theoretical perspectives: Consociationalism and 
associated principles 
Consociationalism is founded on the understanding that divided 
territories on the basis of regions or states or communities are usually 
governed according to consociational principles (O’Leary 1987:11; 
McGarry 1988:44). In most societies, the ‘division’ is driven by ethnicity, 
religion or language, or, sometimes, political inclinations. The concept 
of ‘divided societies’ as it relates to ‘consociationalism’ denotes separate 
cultural communities each running its own political and socio-economic 
institutions (Lijphart 1975:83–84). More often, such cultural divisions 
would limit interactions and communications across boundaries which 
could be geographic, socio-cultural and even psychological. Some scholars 
have defined ‘divided societies’ by pointing out that such phenomena play 
out during important national functions such as elections and boundary 
reviews (Fraenkel and Grofman 2006:630; Barry 1975:480). In other words, 
there can be no ‘uniformity’ on how such societies respond to such matters 
of national importance.
To frame these issues, one has to understand key principles underpinning 
‘consociationalism’ as a model of resolving conf lict in divided societies. 
3.1 Consociationalists’ debate
The consociational debates tend to link conf licts to ethnic divisions. 
In the context of South Sudan, these divisions follow narrow cleavages of 
ethnicity and socio-economic diversities. For example, pastoral herders vs. 
agricultural farmers, those who participated in the liberation struggle vs 
collaborators with Khartoum – the former referred to as ‘heroes’ while the 
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latter are seen as ‘traitors’, or those who were in the diaspora vs those who 
fought the guerrilla war in the ‘bush’. The division in fragile countries 
such as South Sudan is due to a combination of political power, socio-
cultural loyalty and national symbolism. This implies that the hypothetical 
significance of the consociational approach to conf lict resolution lies in 
how such multifaceted layers of issues can be accommodated within a 
single settlement.
Consociational theorists further argue that the destabilising effects of 
sub-cultural or territorial segmentation are neutralised at the elite level by 
embracing non-majoritarian mechanisms for conf lict resolution (Andeweg 
2000:510, McGrattan 2012:390). However, some scholars (O’Leary 2003:670; 
Barry 2006:395) caution that even though the model attracted curiosity in 
resolving conf licts in moderately divided Anglo-Saxon countries, it might 
worsen the situation in multipolar societies. This is particularly the case of 
South Sudan where the historical injustices provoke hostile emotions along 
ethnic ‘fault lines’. Helen Kyed and Mikael Graves (2015:5–10) on the other 
hand, are hopeful that efforts to link economic and territorial pillars in 
peacemaking processes could develop ‘trust’ among the warring groups, 
hence leading to sustainable peace (MacGinty 2010:400). 
Still, while anti-consociational narratives admit that cultural and political 
integrative approaches sound logical in addressing identity issues, 
they remain sceptical and claim that according to lessons from Europe 
(for example, Northern Ireland) transforming conf lict through ‘identity 
change’ is always challenging in deeply divided societies (Kunze 2015:11–12; 
Dixson 2011). In short, they argue that consociationalism cannot deliver 
peace, merely on the basis of building bridges. They note that, in order 
to resolve such conf licts, it is imperative to address issues of territorial 
boundaries (Ibekwe 2012:74–75). Agreeably, other scholars argue that 
the formal institutions of power sharing are insufficient and therefore 
incapable of overcoming the belligerent and unspoken self-interests of the 
leading political elites (Seymour 2014:3; Cammett and Malesky 2012:987).
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Nonetheless, a few success stories of how the consociational model can 
resolve and sustain peace stand out. One of them is Switzerland, which is 
established on consociationalism (Bohn 1981:1237; Bogaards and Crepaz 
2002:360; Bogaards 2000:400). Based on the success of Switzerland, 
consociationalism is predicated on ‘organizational principles’: the first 
being executive power sharing, which implies that each of the main 
communities in the conf lict share in executive power (Mueller 2014:85).
However, as is the case in other states in sub-Saharan Africa, class domination 
and the ‘big man’ syndrome complicate the case of South Sudan, excluding 
those regarded as ‘outsiders’ from the centre of power. Class politics seem 
to make the political elites in South Sudan thrive on violent ascent to power 
(Madut 2013:3; Pospieszna and Schneider 2013:50; Pinaud 2014:197). 
This is what Pa’gan Okiech (2016:10) reconstructs as the kleptocratic regime 
in Juba. The debate on a kleptocratic form of governance is well understood 
when framed within the principles of power-sharing consociationalism. 
3.2 Consociationalism: Core principles of power-sharing 
In addition to power sharing, consociationalism is premised on three 
other principles: autonomy/self-government, proportionality, and veto 
rights. The principle of self-government dictates that each faction to the 
conf lict enjoys some measure of autonomy. In culturally divided societies, 
where the warring groups are concerned with identities, there should be 
an arrangement to have self-governance on matters of cultural concern. 
Andele Jinadu (1985:75) observes that this theory also provides a basis 
for the development and utilisation of consociational conf lict-regulating 
mechanisms. A conf lict-regulating mechanism can however, give rise to 
affirmative action policies to consolidate elite domination by an ethnically 
based political class faction. 
Affirmative action as a tool for consociationalism is indeed problematic, 
in that in situations of ‘self-determination disputes’, ethno-national 
communities focus on contested homelands. The unresolved question is 
then, who should exercise power at the level of central government? In such 
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cases, the effectiveness of federalism and consociationalism as conf lict 
resolution mechanisms may be limited. In federal states such as Nigeria, 
the competition to control the state and its resources has compelled 
political parties to cross-cut ethnic cleavages (Jinadu 1985:76). Critiques 
of consociationalism on the basis of the self-autonomy principle raise 
concerns that the approach is too elitist and that executive instruments of 
policymaking and conf lict regulation lack popular control to bring peace 
to the ‘grass-root’ level (Hueglin 1985:203; Dixson 1996:131).
The principle of proportionality assumes that economic, political and 
territorial resources in divided societies can be distributed proportionally. 
For instance, each belligerent group is represented proportionally in key 
public institutions and is a beneficiary of public resources and expendi-
tures in pro rata measures (McGarry 1988:240). In fragile post-conf lict 
societies, scholars have underscored the use of the ‘closed-list proportional 
representation’ electoral system as the most effective power-sharing 
mechanism (Cammett and Malesky 2012:983). They further observe that 
this approach to conf lict resolution, if well executed, might produce not 
only good governance, but also stability, and might prevent recurrence of 
conf lict by emphasising the application of democratic processes such as 
voting and equitable distribution of state power (Cammett and Malesky 
2012:998). This notwithstanding, the institution of democracy is difficult 
to attain because the ‘majority votes and seats can dominate minority 
groups’ (Ottaway 2003:316).
The final principle is mutual veto, which is the most complex to 
implement. It assumes that, when resolving conf lict instigated by ethnic-
political competition, a feature that characterises South Sudan’s conf lict, 
mechanisms should be put in place to prevent domination in decision-
making processes. This, however, was not done in South Sudan and what 
accordingly happened was the SPLM-IO fall-out and the subsequent 
divorce between Dr Riek Machar and President Salva Kiir. Heavy-weight 
political manoeuvres around individual-based political settlements, may 
anyway be expected in fragile states (Menocal 2011:1720). 
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Rudy Andeweg (2000:520) contests some of the auxiliary principles 
of consociationalism – such as ‘consensus democracy’ which remains 
controversial. Some scholars have posed the question as to whether the very 
logic of consociationalism may lead to a prescription for more adversarial 
politics, particularly in countries that have experienced social cleavages 
(McGrattan 2012:395). Allison McCulloch’s (2014:503) analysis, based 
on various countries where the consociational model has been applied, 
suggests that ethnicity should be recognised through ‘consociational’ 
institutions, as this may lead to an increase in inter-ethnic accommodation. 
For example, the proposed boundaries review process aimed at creating 
twenty-eight (28) states seems to have evoked ethnic consciousness, with 
bordering communities such as Bare and Mundare in Central Equatoria 
fighting over boundaries. These factors have been fuelling conf lict among 
Sudanese people from as early as the 1950s to the 70s (Rolandsen 2011:216; 
Sambanis 2004:840). The failure/success of power-sharing consociational 
arrangements depends on the capacities and interests of armed groups 
involved in or excluded from an agreement (Spears 1999:527).
In South Sudan, successive policies of power sharing offer political payoffs 
for insurgent violence, thereby turning the rebel path into an appealing 
option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked aspirations (Podder 2013:20). 
A fundamental problem has been that, rather than building peace, these ‘deals’ 
represent little more than an elite ‘gentlemanly’ understanding on how the 
spoils of patronage are shared. It is against this background that readers 
of democracy in Africa, such as Nicholas Cheeseman (2011:339–340), 
caution that ‘formal power-sharing institutions in most parts of Africa are 
hurriedly designed to deal with crisis, hence high propensity to undermine 
prospects for sustainable peace.’ 
The most feasible mechanism of power sharing according to Donald 
Horowitz (2014) is a combination of both consociationalism and a 
‘centripetal approach’. In both cases, the ultimate goal is to create inter-
ethnic power-sharing political structures by establishing ethnically based 
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parties (Spears 1999:30). Yet, others caution that power-sharing processes 
are too risky, especially when the operating environment is characterised 
by notions of competition for political power (Traniello 2008:30).
It is evident that the outcome of the ‘power-sharing consociational’ structures 
can be weak, underdeveloped and untested ‘governance structures’ that 
continue to ‘bleed’ complications in South Sudan’s quest for sustainable 
peace – a problem that is interrogated by this academic prognosis.    
4. The ‘bleeding’ complications and power-sharing ‘deals’
Despite numerous interventions, sustainable peace in South Sudan remains 
elusive, which prompts the question why the formal institutions based on 
the principles of consociationalism are insufficient to deliver peace in the 
country. The factional fighting that broke out in Juba between the SPLM-IG 
and SPLM-IO on 10 July 2016, gnarled the peace deal that had been agreed 
upon in April. The quest for peace is complicated by both structural 
and systemic factors. These include: 1) weak institutions of governance, 
2) challenges associated with the politics of power-sharing, 3) politico-
ethnic complications, 4) territorial tensions, 5) militarisation of the peace 
process, and 6) proliferation of parties to the peace process. 
In regard to the first problem, there is the missing link between the 
governing institutions and the prioritisation of the socio-economic and 
cultural needs (Apuuli 2015:125). What does it mean to have Dr Riek 
Machar excluded from the peace process? The Transitional Government of 
National Unity (TGoNU) formed on 29 April 2016 was not enshrined in the 
Constitution. It was obvious that there were articles of the peace agreement 
which were in stark contradiction with provisions of the Transitional 
Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS) (Wassara 2016). People expected the 
harmonisation of the TCSS with the ARCSS, which did not happen until 
violence engulfed the country on 10 July 2016.
The second complication arises from the politics of power sharing. Arend 
Lijphart (1975:85) has defined consociationalism as requiring a ‘grand 
coalition’. The formation of a grand coalition has, however, been viewed as 
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the main weakness in the design of power-sharing agreements (McGarry 
and O’Leary 2004:215). The South Sudan case helps people realise 
that although grand coalitions are empirical possibilities, what makes 
consociations feasible and workable is joint consent across the significant 
communities, with emphasis on ‘jointness’ as opposed to ‘parallelism’. 
The peace deal of August 2015 continued to suffer sluggish implementation, 
amid struggles in the ranks of political elites. Engagement of regional 
states in the South Sudan conf lict resolution remains controversial. 
For instance, Uganda called for a mini-summit comprised of Ethiopia, 
Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. The purpose of the mini-summit was 
to assure President Salva Kiir that those provisions he disagreed with will 
be dropped from the text of the agreement.
The provisions of the agreement objected to by the government of South 
Sudan were, among others, the demilitarisation of Juba, the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from South Sudan, the monitoring and verification 
mechanism, the cantonment of forces, the accountability for war crimes, 
and separate armies (Africa Confidential 2016:5). Tensions among 
mediators persisted until the deal dubbed Agreement on the Resolution 
of the Conf lict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed on 17 August 2015. 
The Ethiopian Prime Minister and the Ugandan President became involved 
in verbal altercations resulting in the early departure of Yoweri Museveni 
before the agreement signing. This meant that only the leaders of the 
SPLM/A-IO and the representative of the SPLM/A former detainees 
and other stakeholders signed. President Salva Kiir declined to sign the 
Agreement on 17 August 2015. However, he later signed the agreement on 
26 August 2016 after registering sixteen reservations.
Thirdly, the deepening politico-ethnic division complicates the deal. 
Political settlement is one of the dimensions of the power-sharing method 
of conf lict resolution (Hartmann 2013:127). In August 2016, the two rival 
groups fought fiercely in Juba with accusations and counter-accusations 
of attempted assassination of their respective leaders by the other group. 
In this case, the creation of a consociational political compromise was 
required. The Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2003:48) model 
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of political power sharing recommends that in a divided society, peace 
settlements should not only lay down structures for distributing political 
power in the core governing institutions of the state among groups, but 
also organise security structures in a manner that provides a ‘fall-back’ 
scenario for each party. 
The August 2015 power-sharing arrangement did allow former Vice-
President Dr Riek Machar to retain soldiers loyal to SPLM-IO, but that 
was contrary to the host of reservations levelled against the August peace 
agreement by President Salva Kiir. Critiques of power sharing are sceptical 
of its success in resolving complex conf licts (Spears 2013:35). The Kenyan 
one that sparked the post-election violence in 2007/8 collapsed shortly 
before the 2013 elections due to lack of trust, historical factors and – 
more critically – ethnic bigotry between the ruling Agikuyu community 
and the former Prime Minister, Raila Amollo Odinga, who hails from the 
Luo community. 
The fourth complication arises from the very principle of power sharing 
between territorial sections of a country. Andreas Mehler (2009a:8) 
identifies four dimensions of power sharing: 1) inclusiveness, 2) degree of 
power, 3) level of power sharing, and 4) relative prominence of negotiators. 
Others, however, have cautioned that power sharing in Africa is narrowly 
exercised through federalism and decentralisation (Zanker et al. 2015:80). 
Federalism and decentralisation of power is usually achieved through 
the constitutionally entrenched system of governance that demands 
greater autonomy (Dash 2007:697–700). In South Sudan, the question of 
devolving power is not adequately addressed within the existing devolved 
structures of governance. The Riek Machar-led faction prefers federalism 
and defines it as a system in which power is shared between multiple levels 
of government as a means of arresting ethnic or regional divisions (Adeba 
2015; Pospieszna and Schneider 2013:45). 
Fifth, the militarisation of the peace process introduces further 
complications. Military power sharing ‘seeks to distribute authority 
within the coercive apparatus of the state’ (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015:43). 
In this case, warring groups are integrated into a ‘unified’ state security 
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force (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003:306). It seeks to specify the details 
around staffing, chain of command and control, and make-up of the state’s 
coercive agencies. In line with this military strategy, the August 2015 peace 
agreement included proportional numbers of forces mainly from SPLM-IG 
and SPLM-IO. Nevertheless, what was witnessed in Juba on Friday, 
29 April 2016, was the appointment of each group to key leadership positions 
in all arms of government, including the security sector. The military 
dominant arrangement seems to have entrenched what Clemence Pinaud 
(2014:194) describes as ‘dominant class’, and which caused a situation 
that led to violence in Juba. No wonder, the widespread confrontations 
that ensued in 2016 began with deep altercations between SPLM-IG 
and SPLM-IO military forces laying allegiance to President Kiir and 
Dr Machar respectively.   
Finally, the increase in the number of actors in the peace process is a 
factor that perpetuates contradictory articulation of demands. In the 
past, mediators used to deal with the Government and the two factions 
of the SPLM (in opposition and former detainees). Now, we have 
newcomers on the scene like the National Salvation Front (NAS), the 
South Sudan National Movement for Change (SSNMC), the National 
Democratic Movement (NDM), civil society organisations, and faith-based 
organisations. Nine parties accused the government of lack of political will 
to negotiate meaningful peace (Wassara and Kurimoto 2017:124; South 
Sudan Opposition 2018). 
This proliferation of actors in the conf lict and the growing distrust in the 
President Kiir-led government has led to the failure of the IGAD initiative 
to make peace deals during the second round of negotiations in February 
2018. These structural challenges continue to diminish hopes that the 
IGAD-led revitalisation process will bear fruit. The process which at best 
can be described as the ‘old’ camouf laged as ’new’ is unlikely to result in any 
meaningful progress in the search for peace. This is due to the challenges 
of the previous efforts, such as inability to resolve the deeply entrenched 
mistrust among the various stakeholders and dismissal of the revitalisation 
process as Troika-controlled. The threats by IGAD to freeze bank accounts 
54
Francis Onditi, Kizito Sabala and Samson Wassara
of peace spoilers will not move the main protagonist in the conf lict due 
to the lack of political leverage and clout, and converging interests from 
within and across the region. 
Looking beyond domestic politics, the conf lict resolution processes seem to 
have widened its regional presence. For example, in May 2018, the Members 
of the IGAD Council of Ministers travelled to South Africa on a shuttle 
diplomacy mission to hold consultations with the former South Sudan Vice-
President, Dr Riek Machar. On this note, the former President of Botswana, 
Festus Mogae, who is also the Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and 
Evaluation Commission, urged stakeholders to the conf lict not to miss the 
opportunity for making peace during the next round of peace talks that 
were scheduled to resume in Addis Ababa. Although the IGAD-led High-
Level Revitalization Peace Forum was optimistic that talks will pave the 
way for sustainable peace, ‘trust’ between President Salva Kiir and Dr Riek 
Machar continues to play a critical role in the management of the conf lict. 
In fact, the opportunity to strike a peace deal hangs in the balance after it 
emerged that the former military chief, General Paul Malong Awan Anei, 
was side-lined from the Addis Ababa peace talks. Indeed, trust seem to be 
the only way to assure warring groups and citizens that the two leaders are 
committed to resolving the conf lict.
Failure to build trust among the key protagonists and other actors in 
the conf lict and fatigue may impede the would-be peace promoters. 
The economy will then probably continue to plummet, the humanitarian 
situation may worsen, and the likelihood of South Sudan becoming a 
forgotten country may become a reality. 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
The foregoing discussion reveals the limitations of trying to over-rely on 
power-sharing consociationalism as a model of conf lict resolution without 
linking such processes to the society in its entirety. What is recognised 
as ‘best practice’ may not be the right prescription for every ethnic-based 
conf lict around the world.  Institutional weaknesses, lack of trust as well as 
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lack of conditions supportive of the ‘best practice’ are better off pursuing 
‘second-best alternatives.’ As such, our conclusion and recommendations in 
this article contend that mitigating the reliance on formal institutions and 
individuals to resolve the conf lict in South Sudan would reduce incentives 
for trapping the country in the conf lict, and greatly increase chances of 
citizens’ ownership of the peace process and destiny for their country.     
5.1 Conclusions   
This article frames the discussion of the past and the ongoing peace and 
conf lict resolution situation in South Sudan within the framework of a 
power-sharing consociational model as contained in the April 2016 political 
rearrangement. It is grounded on the understanding that the problem in 
South Sudan is partly due to lack of transformation of the country from a 
pseudo-political military party, the SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO, into a public 
policy-driven political structure that can allow democratic governance 
to thrive. Analysis of the power-sharing model has demonstrated that, in 
spite of the merits in resolving politically instigated violence, the model 
is not necessarily a ‘one-size-fits-all’. This is partly because the current 
kleptocratic style of governance in South Sudan was built on ethnic politics 
and military dominance leading to a culture of violence. The making 
and partial implementation of the South Sudan 2015 Peace Agreement 
indicates some limitations of the classical consociationalism model, due 
to its conceptual contradictions as well as contextual complications that 
continue to impede possibilities of sustainable peace in the country. 
It is therefore fair, that we conclude this article by deducing the main 
limitations that a consociational South Sudan will have to address on its 
path to sustainable peace and stability.
5.2 Recommendations: The future of consociationalism in 
South Sudan
One of the weaknesses that consociationalism presents is dominance of 
certain groups in peace deals. For sustainable peace and stability to be 
achieved in South Sudan, the ordinary population should be involved in the 
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management of the country through efficient constitutionally respected 
institutions such as central and state legislative assemblies and mandates. 
In this way, checks and balances can be provided against the excesses of 
the state; and democratic values, principles and voices can be protected in 
domestic politics. A range of policy recommendations towards a political 
realignment in South Sudan, may also be made available. However, we shall 
focus our recommendations on: 1) Resolving contextual challenges; and 
2) Conceptual f lexibility.
5.2.1 Resolving contextual challenges 
Analysis in the article demonstrates that previous design and 
implementation of consociationalism in South Sudan has misconstrued 
the critical role of the external actors or what we coin in this article as 
‘the actor in the neighbourhood’. Although conf lict resolution in South 
Sudan has involved national, regional and global mediators, the struggle 
for autonomy has sealed the country off from its former master – Sudan. 
Yet, the role of Khartoum in the South Sudan conf lict cannot be ignored. 
This has produced two related problems. First, there has been a tendency 
to downplay the importance of the disputed boundaries – both internally 
and externally – by overemphasising the political power-sharing narrative 
and mechanics. Thus, the design and operation of consociationalism has 
neglected the possibilities of positive roles that Khartoum could play in the 
implementation and in the active operation of power-sharing settlements. 
As a result of this policy lacuna, Khartoum’s role tends to lean towards 
the role of a ‘spoiler’. Dr Riek Machar’s self-exile in Khartoum has raised 
suspicion as to the role President Al-Bashir of Sudan plays in the entire 
conf lict spectrum.
Importantly, there is the role of self-determination in uniting divided 
societies. This is more of a contextual problem than a conceptual one. 
Evolution of consociationalism is traced in European countries – the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. In other contexts, 
however, analysts argue that this approach might be counterproductive, 
especially in circumstances where the majority would like to have majority 
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rule, while the minorities want guarantees against an overruling majority 
rule (Dixson 1996:135; O’Leary 2003:700). This condition is fertile ground 
for degradation of inter-ethnic trust and a recipe for even deeper class 
divisions based on ethnic identities. Such class divisions are mainly fuelled 
by the need to access territorial, economic, military and political resources. 
Policy analysts and political scientists might want to classify such 
complications as ‘resource curse’ (Auty 2001:840; Shaxson 2007:1130), but 
due to the centrality of ethnic identities in South Sudan, we think that the 
social complexity presented by the conf lict in South Sudan can be well 
articulated as the ‘tragedy of ethnic diversity’. One consequence of this type 
of social formation is that the emphasis in the traditional consociational 
model is on who should exercise power at the level of the central government. 
But self-determination disputes are often about how much power should be 
exercised by the central government and about whether there should be one 
or more central governments. Although autonomy is an important value in 
consociational arrangements, the emphasis in South Sudan is more often 
on territorial than on corporate autonomy. 
A second Khartoum-related problem that was identified in the conso-
ciational South Sudan is the tendency to treat the state as a sovereign, 
independent and insulated entity. In South Sudan, even within the internal 
state-centric approach favoured in traditional consociational accounts, 
there has been an overly narrow focus on the design of the SPLM, and the 
need for agreement on whether the country can transform the SPLM into 
a fully-f ledged political structure. The emergence of SPLM-IO was aimed 
at providing an alternative ideological stance, hence paving the way for a 
functional democracy. It is however important to note that the journey to 
sustainable peace normally requires agreement on issues that go beyond 
such institutions, such as the security sector reform, reforms in the police, 
demilitarisation, the return of exiles to their homes and more importantly, 
reintegration of ex-combatants into the society. 
In order to address the challenge of reintegration in South Sudan, it is 
worth highlighting an institutional weakness of conventional consocia-
tional thinking. Lack of political will creates ‘insolvency’ in consociations; 
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it appears to be premised upon overcoming trust and voluntariness. In South 
Sudan, absence of a forum via which political discourse could be directly 
effectual has been cause for the lack of sustainable political architecture. 
The political manoeuvres we are currently witnessing in Juba is a symptom 
of a ‘captured state’, a country awaiting the return of Machar – when the 
worst could happen.
5.2.2 Conceptual Flexibility
A further insight is into possibilities of conceptualising and contextualising 
consociationalism within the realities of African states’ ‘capture’ of the 
society and behaviour of the military and political elites. Although Lijphart 
has traditionally defined a consociation as requiring a ‘grand coalition’, 
many see that as consociation’s key weakness (both because it is difficult 
to achieve such a coalition, and because it is said to preclude democratic 
opposition). 
Finally, democratic governance is central to this process of change and, 
importantly, to the impression of stability through its role in bringing 
together concepts, interaction and context. In other countries where 
consociationalism has worked, such as Northern Ireland, the 1998 and 
2006 agreements have been carefully presented so as not to imply ‘radical 
change’ to the ideologies and goals of the parties concerned (Zuhair 2008). 
The key to their success was the ability to propagate moves that were in 
line with the interests of one’s own group in a tactical and pragmatic way. 
Although there were several differences in the ideological settings and 
strategies (Filardo-Llamas 2008), between Northern Ireland and South 
Sudan, the underlying principle for most countries experiencing ethnic/
ideological division is how to manage diversity and address the challenges 
associated with what we have coined in this article as the tragedy of ethnic 
diversity, a term that is not intended to replace the concept of ‘resource 
curse’, but an alternative thinking on how best to conceptualize complex 
conf lict systems in Africa and beyond. 
Thus, in this article we do not have references to a ‘United South Sudan’, 
as was the case in countries where consociationalism worked such as 
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Northern Ireland, but only to an ‘Agreed South Sudan’ – a phrase which 
we believe acknowledges the necessary consent of all its members in order 
to make consociationalism work in Africa.
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